Seven separate CO2 emissions bills were floated in Congress in 2007. All claim that they would achieve comparable targets to those called for by the scientific community: roughly a 20% reduction in emissions from current levels by 2020 and a 70% reduction by 2050. The "Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act" introduced by Bernard Sanders and Barbara Boxer set a target of 80% by 2050. It has now died, making way for "America's Climate Security Act," sponsored by Joe Lieberman and John Warner, who claim it will produce a 63% reduction during the same time frame. The five other bills set targets that fall within the range set by these two.
Deemed most likely to win bipartisan support, the Lieberman-Warner bill jumped to the head of the pack as soon as it was introduced in October. On December 5, the Environment and Public Works Committee sent the bill to the full Senate, the first time a comprehensive emissions reduction bill has made it out of committee.
Mainstream environmental organization have been engaged in an intense
battle over Lieberman-Warner. Business friendly groups like Environmental Defense, the Sierra Club, and Earthjustice support it as a deal that can get done. Meanwhile more radical groups like Friends of the Earth and 1Sky
argue that it is too weak. They also recognize that Bush is likely to veto any bill that passes, so they favor waiting till 2009 when a greener president may lead the charge for real change.
What's most remarkable about this debate is its narrowness. All seven bills rely on
cap-and-trade permitting schemes to achieve their projected reductions. And no one asks whether this method will actually achieve anything approaching the emissions reductions claimed by the bills.
Existing cap-and-trade schemes have shown notoriously mixed
results. The first emissions market was created by the Clean Air Act of 1990 to control the acid-rain causing pollutant, sulfur dioxide. It has managed to achieve significant overall reductions since it was implemented, mainly because it is simple, governing only emissions of a single chemical from a single industry, coal-fired electricity plants. Acid rain is less severe, but it continues to be a problem. And rather than serve as a foundation for improvement, the plan has become a ceiling, since companies can claim double jeopardy when further reductions are proposed.
Some skeptics prefer the term "cap-and-giveaway" because of the way emissions markets are rigged to favor already dominant companies. When a new emissions market is implemented, permits are usually handed out free to historical polluters (so-called "existing users of the atmosphere"). Ironically, start-up companies then have to buy their way into the market, meaning there's a built-in barrier to the deployment of newer, cleaner technologies. Inevitably, the cost of emissions permits will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher energy prices, and older companies will reap the biggest profits.
Finally, politically powerful companies have proven to be very good at manipulating the design of emissions markets. In Europe's recently introduced CO2 market, for example, corporate lobbyists won an overall emissions cap that was much higher than needed. When the market began to function, prices crashed from $30 to 1$ a ton, allowing big polluters to buy up permits on the cheap. At the same time, they used the new program as an excuse to hike consumer prices by 25%, raking in huge profits.
Supporters praise market-based plans for giving companies flexibility to determine how to achieve sector-wide goals. What that really means is that they give polluters carte blanche to do what they already do best: buy their way out of compliance, then pass the cost on to the rest of us.